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David T. Ellwood 
Teenage unemployment poses a puzzle for economists. Its causes and 
consequences are not well understood becuase of  conflicting economic 
analyses. The human capital model suggests  that since investment should 
be quite heavy in the early years, teenage unemployment carries with it 
heavy costs. But search theory suggests that shopping around is a neces- 
sary and desirable activity, particularly for those with little information 
about opportunities in the labor market. There is also concern that early 
labor force attachment may be weak, raising the possibility that early 
unemployment may just represent consumption of leisure. This chapter 
focuses on the longer-term consequences of early spells out of work for 
male teenagers. 
The fundamental problem in capturing the long-term effects of unem- 
ployment is separating differences in employment and wages which are 
causally related to early unemployment,  from the differences due to 
unobserved  personal  characteristics correlated with  early  unemploy- 
ment. Whereas elsewhere in economics researchers routinely assume 
homogeneity of  tastes and preferences, heterogeneity lies at the very 
heart of  the issue here.  Separating the individual component  is the 
primary challenge faced in this chapter. 
This chapter is divided into three sections. The first simply describes 
the early labor market experience of  the young men in  this sample. 
Strangely, there is little published data tracing the experience of  a com- 
plete cohort over four years. In most other work the high rates of attrition 
and reentrance into the sampleover the period at least open the possibil- 
ity of distorting the underlying pattern. The second section extends the 
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work of Heckman and Chamberlain to test the long-term effects of early 
employment on future employment. The final section uses a Sims-type 
causality model to measure the impact of  work experience on wages. 
I conclude that the effects of a period without work do not end with that 
spell. A teenager who spends time out of work in one year will probably 
spend less time working in the next than he would have had he worked the 
entire year. Furthermore, the lost work experience will also be reflected 
in lower wages. At the same time, my data provide no evidence that early 
unemployment sets off a vicious cycle of  recurrent unemployment. The 
reduced employment effects die off very quickly. What appear to persist 
are effects of  lost work experience on wages. 
Scars-In  Theory and Practice 
It is useful to begin by examining the implications of early unemploy- 
ment according to several of  the more common labor theories. Perhaps 
most prominent in its prediction of  long-term effects is human capital 
theory. While the theory is not concerned with early unemployment 
inducing later unemployment, its emphasis on human investment early in 
the job career to explain the concave pattern of  aggregate age-earnings 
profiles implicitly imposes heavy costs on the unfortunate young person 
who misses out on early investment opportunities. If  no investment takes 
place during the period without employment, the entire profile is shifted 
back. Even if  retirement is also delayed, the present value of  the entire 
earnings streams must now be discounted over the lost time. 
The dual labor market theorists paint an equally bleak picture. Poor 
work habits develop over the periods of discouragement, catalyzing  weak 
labor force attachment and alienation. The result is a vicious cycle of 
unemployment followed by deterioration followed by more unemploy- 
ment. Pervading the institutional literature is the related notion of track- 
ing. Teenagers face only a limited number of  entry-level jobs which lead 
to better jobs. Those who miss good jobs early are permamently tracked 
onto inferior ladders. 
One troybling question is whether early unemployment is largely a 
result of a job shortage or of weak labor force attachment. Most theories 
that predict long-term impacts of unemployment emphasize the involun- 
tary nature of  early unemployment. If  much of  it is “voluntary,” it still 
may  be  reasonable  to consider  whether  there  are long-term  conse- 
quences. Teenage unemployment cannot be strictly voluntary since it is 
so strongly countercyclical. But it is possible that some portion of  the 
problem is due to weak attachment. Young people may take jobs only 
when they are readily available. Early experience may quicken labor 
force attachment and reinforce desirable work skills. If  it is considered 
socially desirable to hasten the assimilation process, then it would be 
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A slightly more sophisticated argument emphasizes the severe infor- 
mational problems of  the young in the labor market. Teenagers and 
employers are involved in an elaborate game of  mixing and matching 
skills and jobs, but there is relatively little information available to either 
party. The employers rely heavily on evidence of past work experience in 
making hiring decisions because they need to separate persons with poor 
work skills and weak attachments from those with superior work qual- 
ities. Employers avoid hiring workers who have been out of  school for 
some time but have little experience, so those workers who were involun- 
tarily unemployed are inappropriately typed as poor workers. The prob- 
lems may be exacerbated in recessionary times. If  employers are slow to 
adjust their expectations for experience from young applicants, cohorts 
entering a weak labor market will suffer. Of course, permanent damage 
need not occur at all. Early unemployment may simply be productive job 
search or simple consumption of  leisure. 
There is a small but rapidly growing literature testing the long-term 
effects of early spells of unemployment (see for example Becker and Hills 
[  19781, Stevenson [  19781). These papers conclude that early unemploy- 
ment has sizable long-term effects. The methodology usually involves 
regressions of wages or weeks worked of persons beyond their teens on 
duration and/or spells of  teenage unemployment several years earlier. 
Although most pay lip service to the difficulty of controlling for individual 
differences, it is typical to include several background variables as a 
control in the equations. This methodology is troubling. If  there is a true 
job shortage employers are likely to hire the highest quality workers first. 
If  early unemployment is in part a reflection of  weak attachment, then 
some persons with unemployment are also low-quality workers. In either 
case, wrly unemployment is certain to be highly correlated with aspects 
of worker quality. The findings of  these studies document persistence 
very  convincingly but  serious questions  remain  about whether  early 
experience has causal effects in later economic behavior. 
I conclude that while long-term effects do exist, they may be a good 
deal smaller than the literature suggests. 
The Data 
Current published data tends to obfuscate early patterns of  market 
experience.  Data from  the Current Population  Survey are currently 
published by age group and school enrollment status. Throughout this 
chapter, I will concentrate only on those persons out of school. I see many 
fewer possibilities for long-term effects of unemployment during school. 
The composition of  the 16-19  year old out-of-school labor force is very 
different from that of  the 20-24  age group. The 1619  year old group 
includes early dropouts and high school graduates. The 20-24 year old 
group includes persons with little school but eight years of  experience 352  David T. Ellwood 
along with recent college graduates. To look across different age groups 
and to draw conclusions about the patterns of unemployment as persons 
age is to invite error. 
Ideally, one should like to follow a cohort of persons permanently out 
of  school over five or ten years. The National Longitudinal Survey of 
Young Men-the  so-called “Parnes data”-allows  such an examination. 
Some 5225 young men between the ages of 14 and 24 were interviewed in 
1966. They were then reinterviewed annually through 1971, then again in 
1973, and again in  1975. Typically, respondents  were interviewed in 
November about their current labor force status and most recent wage as 
well as about their experience over the past year. The sample chosen for 
analysis here was a group of  roughly 750 young men who left school 
“permanently” in 1965, 1966, or 1967 with less than fourteen years of 
education. Unfortunately, this period was the height of the Vietnam war. 
Thus slightly over half the sample is not observed in the four full years 
after they left school, primarily because of  military service. The 364 
young men who remain do appear to be somewhat less prone to unem- 
ployment and time out of the labor force. Persons who were observed in 
the first full year out of  school but were not observed in some later year 
had a labor force participation rate of 84.1  %, an unemployment rate of 
7.1%, and an employment rate of 78.2%. Persons who remained in the 
sample had rates of  86.1%, 5.0%, and 81.8% respectively. This sample 
selection is an obvious source of potential bias and will be addressed in 
more detail later. 
Another well-known “problem” with the Parnes data is that they show 
very different rates of employment and unemployment than do published 
statistics derived for the CPS.’ The longitudinal data used here show 
much higher employment rates and lower unemployment rates than the 
CPS data. For a discussion of the likely reasons for these differences see 
Freeman and Medoff (chapter 4 of  this volume). The sample selection 
and CPS comparison suggest that the NLS sample may miss some of the 
longer-term unemployed persons, for whom unemployment could have 
the most serious consequences. Thus the current sample could serve to 
underrepresent the long-term consequences of early labor market experi- 
ence. 
Few of the young men in the survey data leave school in November. In 
the year of leaving school, retrospective labor force figures cover both 
time in and out of  school. After numerous attempts to adjust for the 
problem, I finally decided to simply omit the first part-year of experience. 
In later sections when I refer to the first year of experience, I refer to the 
first full survey year after graduation or dropping out. 
10.1  The Early Labor Market Experience 
The labor market position of young men improves dramatically during 
the first four years out of school. Table 10.1  shows that while an average 353  Teenage Unemployment: Permament Scars or Temporary Blemishes? 
Table 10.1  Unemployment Rate, Employment Ratio, and  Labor  Force 
Participation Rate for Young Men during First Four Years after 
Leaving School in  1965,1966, or 1967 with Less than Thirteen 
Years of  Schooling 
Unemployment  Employment  Labor force par- 
ratea  rateb  ticipation rate' 
Year 1  5.0 
Year 2  6.4 
Year 3  4.8 
Year 4  5.4 
81.8  86.1 
84.7  90.5 
89.3  93.8 
90.0  95.0 
"Average  weeks unemployedaverage weeks in labor force. 
bAverage  weeks employed52. 
'Average week in labor forcel52. 
of  nearly 20%  are without work in  the first year, only 10% are not 
working three years later. Labor force participation rates rise precipi- 
tously, from 86% to 95%. The marked improvement is countercyclical  in 
this case since for roughly two-thirds of the sample (those leaving school 
in 1966 and 1967) the fourth full year out of school comes during 1970 or 
1971-recessionary  years. Indeed, if  the overall economic picture had 
remained stable over this period, even more rapid improvement would 
likely have occurred. Almost immediately, however, the unemployment 
rate shows up as a questionable indicator of labor market performance 
for this group. While the other statistics, most notably the employment 
ratio, show clear improvement over time, the unemployment rate follows 
no clear pattern.  Although it is possible that the unemployment rate 
accurately captures the relative number of  persons seeking work but 
unable to find it, it is also possible that the unchanging unemployment 
statistic misrepresents the trend in the labor market position of  young 
men. In these retrospective figures, unemployment may well mean some- 
thing different to persons one year out of  school than to persons four 
years out. As the young men age, they may become increasingly  reluctant 
to  report themselves as out of the labor force even if they are not spending 
time in productive job search. Another alternative is that in later years 
only a hard core cannot find jobs. These persons become discouraged and 
drop out of the labor force. Either way the distinction between unem- 
ployment and time out of  the labor force is blurred. 
The steady improvement in the employment rate of the cohort masks 
remarkably dynamic labor force patterns. The initial years of  employ- 
ment experience are pocketed with spells of unemployment and time out 
of the labor force.  Only  18% of  all young men  in this sample have 
four-year employment histories unmarred by a spell out of  work. Table 
10.2 shows that nearly 40% of all young men spend time out of the labor 
force in their first year, while just over one-quarter report unemploy- 354  David T. Ellwood 
Table 10.2  Probability of Unemployment, Time out of the Labor Force, and 
Time Not Employed during First Four Years after Leaving School 
Probability of  Probability of  time  Probability of  time 
unemployment  out of  labor force  not employed 
Year 1  26.9%  40.1%  56.6% 
Year 2  27.5  31.9  51.1 
Year 3  23.0  23.6  40.9 
Year 4  21.9  24.1  38.2 
ment. Overall, 57% of  these young men spent some time out of  work. 
The probabilities of  adverse experiences decline substantially over the 
period.  Yet  even in the fourth year  out of  school when the overall 
employment ratio is 90%, almost 40% spend some time not employed. 
And while the labor force participation rate hovers at 95% in that fourth 
year, one-quarter spend some time neither working nor looking for work. 
Perhaps the most dramatic result in these first few tables is the promi- 
nence of time out of the labor force. Nearly 40% of the sample self-report 
time spent neither working nor looking in the first years. These 40% 
report average spells of eighteen weeks-more  than four months-dur- 
ing a period of very low unemployment. Perhaps these are discouraged 
workers.  Yet three-quarters of  them spent no time unemployed at all 
during that first year. Of  course, some may have had severe unemploy- 
ment problems in the part-year preceding the first survey year. Still, four 
months is a remarkably long time to be discouraged, particularly when 
one’s peers are reporting a 5% unemployment rate. The sample selection 
rules, which appear to discriminate against the nonemployed, make the 
results seem even more dramatic. The rapid rise in labor force participa- 
tion  rates  and employment rates during the downward swing of  the 
business  cycle  must  almost  certainly  indicate  increasing labor  force 
attachment. 
One important concern is whether to regard reported unemployment 
as a separate experience from reported time out of  the labor force. The 
evidence cited thus far suggests that retrospective unemployment figures 
do not appear to capture the essence of the employment situation. While 
the distinction between those actively seeking work and those who are 
not seems particularly important in this group, the line is poorly drawn 
using retrospective employment figures. Of course, few labor force statis- 
tics are derived from retrospective data. Still, the standard CPS question 
about whether the teenager has done anything to look for work in the past 
four weeks (a specific method must be listed) may not separate them too 
much more efficiently. 
Unfortunately, if  it is difficult to separate the truly unemployed from 
those with weak labor force attachment in surveys, it may be equally 
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for work  but  have  been  unable to find  it  may  suffer from  guilt by 
association. 
This brief section has painted a pattern of change and diversity. Early 
in their careers young men spend a great deal of time without work. By 
their fourth year, however, most workers are settling into a more stable 
and presumably permanent work situation. The next section shows that 
while the early years are periods of rapid improvement for the young men 
overall, adverse experiences persist. 
10.1.1  The Persistent Pattern 
of Adverse Labor Market Experiences 
Early  labor market  experiences  foretell  future ones.  Persons who 
escape unemployment early will likely escape it later. Figures 10.1,10.2, 
and 10.3 are probability trees for unemployment, time out of  the labor 
force, and time not employed for the four periods. Each branch corre- 
sponds to one period. A one indicates that unemployment or nonemploy- 
ment was experienced in the period, a zero indicates that it was not. 
Above the line in any branch is the probability of  being in that state 
conditional on being at the previous branch. Below the line in parenthe- 
ses is the unconditional probability  of  being on that  branch  (or the 
proportion of  all persons who are found on that branch). The bottom 
number is the average weeks of unemployment in that period by persons 
on that branch.  Thus in figure 10.1, 53.1% of  persons who had been 
unemployed in their first year were unemployed in their second year. Just 
over  14% of  all persons  had  unemployment  both periods  and these 
persons averaged 14.2 weeks of  unemployment in the second year. 
All three figures demonstrate striking persistence in the labor force 
experiences. The probability of  unemployment (nonemployment) in the 
second period conditional on first period spells is .531(.631), while those 
who escaped early problems have only a .180 (.354) probability of unem- 
ployment  (nonemployment).  By  the  fourth  period,  boys  with  three 
straight years with unemployment are seven times more likely to become 
unemployed than those with three straight years without it. 
This sort of probability tree is common in the literature (see Heckman 
and Willis [1977]; Heckman [1978a and 1978b1); however, the patterns 
can be misleading. If  spells are long, say ten weeks, and if  spells are 
distributed randomly throughout the year, then 20% of  all the unem- 
ployed in one year will have spells which overlap into the next one. This 
would cause a much higher probability of  unemployment in the second 
year conditional on having experienced it in the first, regardless of  the 
underlying pattern. In this sort of table, there is no straightforward way of 
making an adjustment for this problem. 
Happily, overlap problems do not affect probabilities of third or fourth 
period events conditional on the first period event. Table 10.3 reveals .684 
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that persons with poor first period records are likely to have poor records 
three or four years later. Persons who spent time out of work in the first 
period have a .447 probability of  similar problems in the final year as 
contrasted to a  .297  probability for those persons with uninterrupted 
work histories in the first year. 
A somewhat more appealing measure of persistence is asimple correla- 
tion matrix. Table 10.4 provides the correlations for weeks of unemploy- 
ment over the first four years and for the weeks not employed. Once 
again the persistence is prominent, but not quite so prominent as might 
be expected. Weeks not employed shows a one-year correlation of about 
.5, but it decays rapidly. Within two years the value falls to around .25. 
Remarkably, weeks unemployed show far less persistence and the pat- 
tern of  decay is erratic. Adjacent year correlations (al2,  ~23,  u34)  show 
some stability, but hover at only about .3, a figure roughly comparable to 
the correlation between weeks not employed one or two years removed. 
The correlation between unemployment in the first and third years (uI3) 
shows evidence of  slight decay, but (~24  shows no such evidence. Then, 
dramatically, uI4  falls to .08. The unorthodox behavior of the unemploy- 
ment figures once again reinforces the earlier concerns about the quality 
of  unemployment measure (at least this retrospective measure) for this 
age group. 
Both the unemployment and nonemployment correlations are more 
stable than would be generated by  a first-order Markov process. The 
stability suggests that individual differences are an important part of  the 
underlying process or that the process is of higher order. Unemployment 
and  nonemployment  are  not  events  randomly  distributed  over  this 
population of  young men. If early unemployment or nonemployment is 
nothing more than search and matching of  workers and jobs, then for 
Table 10.3  Probability of Adverse Market Experiences 
in Later Years Conditional on Earlv Exwrience 
Unem-  Time not 
ployment  Time OLF  employed 
P(l in year 21 
P(l in year 21 
P(l in year 3/ 
P(l in year 3/ 
P(l in year 41 
P(l in year 4/ 
1 in year 1)  ,531  ,418  ,631 
0 in year 1)  ,180  .252  ,354 
1 in year 1)  ,327  .294  ,514 
0 in year 1)  ,194  ,197  ,272 
1 in year 1)  ,345  .294  ,447 
0 in year 1)  ,172  .205  ,297 360  David T. Ellwood 
Table 10.4  Correlation Matrix for Weeks Unemployed and Weeks 
Not Employed during the First Four Years out of School 
Weeks unemployed 
Weeks 
unemployed  Year 1  Year2  Year 3  Year4 
Year 1  1.00  .27  .20  .  0s 
Year 2  1.00  .27  .26 
Year 3  1.00  .39 
Year 4  1.00 
Weeks not employed 
Weeks not 
employed  Year 1  Year 2  Year 3  Year 4 
Year 1  1  .00  .54  .34  .25 
Year 2  1  .OO  .46  .34 
Year 3  1.00  ,47 
Year 4  1.00 
some at least the process is quite protracted. Since adverse employment 
patterns are a problem of a subclass of youngsters, programs to aid them 
ought to be targeted to those with early problems. 
The critical question of  this chapter still remains: Is the persistence a 
reflection only of  individual differences or is future employent causally 
related to past experience? 
10.2  The Impact of Early Unemployment on Future Unemployment: 
Heterogeneity and State Dependence 
Persistence of  labor market behavior has been noted in  numerous 
other settings, most notably in the labor force participation of  married 
women. A newly developing literature seeks to separate the effects of 
individual differences in behavior (heterogeneity) from changes in be- 
havior induced by  a previous event (state dependence). The unique 
character  of  longitudinal data  allows one to control  for  unobserved 
individual characteristics in a way that no strictly cross-sectional data set 
does. Although there are serious conceptual problems with this formula- 
tion, the following model  is  continuous time will  help  illustrate  the 
methodology currently employed in the literature (the problems will be 
considered later): 
Here Yit  is the time person i was in a particular state during period t (i.e. , 
weeks worked), X,  is a vector of exogenous variables, &,is an individual 
constant, Ui,  is a random component. This is simply a model of  a first- 
order Markov process with an individual component. In this example, Sit 
is the control for heterogeneity, y, is the test of state dependence. Such an 361  Teenage Unemployment: Permanent Scars or Temporary Blemishes? 
equation cannot be estimated from cross-sectional  data because there will 
be more parameters than observations since each individual is accorded 
his own intercept. Cross-sectional estimates made without the inclusion 
of  Sit will create upward bias in the state dependence coefficient unless 
that part of  Sit which is correlated with Yit  -  is fully captured by a linear 
combination of  the Xs. 
By imposing restrictions on Sit, one can estimate yt from longitudinal 
data. The individual component can be controlled using data from pre- 
vious years. The simplest assumption is to fix the individual component 
over time, Si, =  Si. To simplify the example further, assume S, =  S,  yr  = y 
and that Cov  (Uit,  Uit-  1) = 0. Simple differencing eliminates the nui- 
sance parameter  Si. Thus 
Y, -  Yi, -  1 = (Xi, -  xi,  -  1)  S + y( Yi, -  1 -  Yi, -  2) 
+ u, -  ui,- 1 
Of course all exogenous variables which are invariant over time are also 
eliminated with this approach. Since the focus here is with the state 
dependence parameter,  y, this is a source of  no concern.  The term 
(Y, - -  Yit  -  2) is now negatively correlated with the error term, so OLS 
results will be negatively biased. However, Yit-  and X,-  can be used 
as instruments for this term and consistent results will be generated. Note 
that absolutely no distributional restrictions are imposed on the Si across 
individuals since they are simply differenced away. 
Heckman (1978a, 1978b) has developed an appealing and more gen- 
eral counterpart to this model for the discrete case. Heckman’s model 
transforms the dichotomous variable into a continuous one by assuming 
the event occurs whenever a continuous latent variable (fit) crosses a 
threshold-here  assumed to be zero. A dummy variable di,  is assumed to 
be one when  f,>O  and zero otherwise. Exogenous variables Xi,  are 
allowed. Using a variance components error structure in Heckman’s 
model, we can allow each individual to have his own individual compo- 
nent, Sit, freely varying over time for the moment. One case of  Heck- 
man’s somewhat more general model is then: 
~,=Xi,B,+~  yir-idit-j+Si,+~it 
Setting yit  pi  = yt -  and Si, = Si and assuming the Si and the  are IID 
normal provide for an estimable model. Heckman offers a heuristic proof 
of identifiability which relies on the ordering of unconditional probabili- 
ties. Suppose t = 2 and the Xs are constant over time. Then conditional 
on Xi and Si, in the absence of  state dependence, the probability of  the 
sequence (1, 0) (one in first period, zero in the second) is equal to the 
probability of  the sequence (0,l). In the presence of state dependence, 
however, P(1, 0) <  P(0, 1). State dependence increases the likelihood 
that persons who experience the event in the first period will experience it 
k 
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again in the second. Therefore P( 1,l)  is increased and P(  1,O) is reduced. 
P(0, 1) on the other hand is unaffected since the event was not experi- 
enced in the first period. This relation holds for each individual; it must 
hold in aggregate. Thus simple run sequences alone allow testing for the 
presence of state dependence under particular functional form assump- 
tions. Run sequences covering more time periods allow testing of  less 
restrictive functional forms. 
Heckman suggests this approach can be usefully applied to a variety of 
situations, including spells of  unemployment.  Several features of  the 
Heckman model make its usefulness in this and related situations ques- 
tionable. For purposes of  this discussion, let us divide early job history 
into only two  states: employed and not employed.  The fundamental 
problem is that the model breaks a continuous time event into artificial 
periods. When the chosen interval is long relative to average length of 
stay in a state, there is inevitably an assymetry in the definition of  states. 
Often periods are chosen to be one year long. A person is observationally 
reported to have been in a particular state for that period if and only if he 
or she experienced the state at any time during the period. In the current 
example persons who experience time out of work any time over a year 
receive ones, persons who do not receive zeros. Thus to be in a state, one 
need experience only one week of nonemployment, but to be out of the 
state one need experience fifty-two  weeks of unemployment. If we simply 
redefine state 1  and having experienced any employment,  a very different 
pattern of  states emerges. Virtually everyone is always in state 1. The 
presence or absence of  state dependence may depend on which state is 
accorded the special privilege of  being designated as the 1. 
On the other hand, if  the periods are short relative to the spells, then 
state dependence exists almost by assumption. If spells tend to be longer 
than periods then the probability of  being in the state conditional on 
having been in it in the previous period is high. Indeed, even if spells tend 
to be four or five times shorter than the periods, one can predict with 
certainty that at least 20 to 25% of persons who experience the event one 
period will experience it again in the next period simply because spells 
overlap. 
The arbitrary designation of time periods and states means an observed 
data point (1, 1) may represent a host of  very different histories. One 
person may have been in the state continuously for two periods. Another 
may have been in it only a few days but those days happened to overlap 
two periods. Still a third person might have had several spells in the state 
in each period. These problems represent more than lost efficiency. They 
imply peculiar results. The problem of  overlapping spells is particularly 
troubling in the current treatment. If  spells last an average of  thirteen 
weeks, then one-fourth of all spells in one year will overlap into another. 
This implies that even if  the spell has no long-term effect, P(l, 1) is 363  Teenage Unemployment: Permament Scars or Temporary Blemishes? 
increased.  Since the P(l  I 1) >  P(1lO) there appears to be state depen- 
dence where there is none. Although these problems are particularly 
acute in the Heckman formulation using years as periods, they are also 
present to some degree in the continuous model presented earlier, as we 
shall see below. 
One way to minimize these problems is to use point in time sampling. 
At the start of each time period persons are interviewed and their current 
state recorded. There is no asymmetry in the definition of states in this 
case. And if  spells tend to be shorter than periods, overlap problems are 
less serious. Of course, there is great loss of information in this approach. 
More importantly, since spells of  employment frequently last several 
years, the chosen periods may have to be quite long. 
Obviously, the notion of  state dependence is a confusing one. In the 
next few paragraphs I present a nontechnical discussion in an attempt to 
clarify some of the concepts. For a more technical treatment see Cham- 
berlain (1978 and 1979). 
A complete analysis of  heterogeneity  and state dependence would 
treat each event in continuous time with a particular starting and ending 
date. We must separate two distinct types of  state dependence. Once a 
person has entered a particular state, say employment, there is a tend- 
ency to remain there for some period of time. The probability of remain- 
ing in some state is always higher than the probability of entering it from 
another if  the time interval is short enough. Virtually all persons who 
work  one minute  will  work  the next,  regardless of  their  underlying 
propensity to work over a month, year, qr decade. Traditionally this 
inertia has been captured with a Markov model. Conditional on being in a 
state, a person has a certain escape probability over a given period of time 
which may be quite independent of  his past history of  spells or states. 
For example, a young black male teenager who is unemployed this 
week could be far more likely to be unemployed next week than if he had 
been employed this week simply because it is hard for young blacks to 
find jobs. It could be that nothing about his work history or his duration of 
current  unemployment  influences his  ability to get  a job; yet  being 
unemployed now indicates that he is less likely to be employed next 
week. Unemployment doesn’t change the individual per se, it is just a 
difficult state for the teenager to escape. Heterogeneity must imply that 
each individual has his or her own escape probability from each state. Let 
us label this form of  state dependence simple Markov-type persistence. 
The key notion is that it is what state one is in that counts, not his past 
history.  This persistence  is  unquestionably  present in  all human en- 
deavors to some degree. 
If  the force  of  escape from  one or another state is  influenced by 
previous experience, then the second form of state dependence-experi- 
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in the current spell. Work history may influence the likelihood of employ- 
ment  when  a teenager  is unemployed.  Experience  dependence cor- 
responds most closely to the conception of state dependence described in 
the literature.  A person is actually “changed” by  a particular event. 
Models which postulate that the accumulation or depreciation of human 
capital or of  information or even of  signals of worker quality alters the 
likelihood of work all imply an altered force of  escape from one state or 
another because of the individual’s  past experience. Ideally, it is this form 
of  state dependence that we seek to capture. 
Simple Markov-type persistence certainly is not uninteresting.  The 
distribution of forces of excape will strongly influence the concentration 
of unemployment across individuals. Macroeconomic policies can alter 
escape rates and may provide great benefit to those with otherwise very 
low rates of escape from unemployment. But if experience dependence is 
not present, once a spell is over so is its impact. 
Unfortunately, the current models capture both Markov-type persist- 
ence and experience dependence simultaneously. Markov persistence 
requires two heterogeneity parameters: the force of  escape from each 
state. In the Heckman formulation this implies an individual intercept iji 
and an individual coefficient on the person’s state last period. This can be 
modeled (omitting the Xs): 
k 
1=2  fit=  6i + *zdit-l  +  Yt-jdi,-j + &it 
If the time periods are quite short, then tii effectively captures the Mar- 
kov-type probability of entering the l state; +i,  the probability of remain- 
ing in it.  With short periods  ditPl  captures the persons most recent 
state-the  “current  state”  while the state in  “next  period”  is being 
determined. Markov persistence virtually guarantees that Jli  will be posi- 
tive as the period shrinks. Experience dependence requires previous job 
history-not  just that the current state alter the probability of entering or 
remaining in a state. Thus coefficients on di,-  2, dil-3  . . .  are nonzero. 
The yt -,  here captures this experience dependence.’ 
Estimation of this model is complicated by the fact that the  iji and +i  are 
highly correlated with di,-  I  and the di,- since high values of  the indi- 
vidual components increase the likelihood that any dij = 1. Estimating 
the equation assuming +i  = T  may substantially upward bias the yt - 
coefficients because the omitted term (+i  -  Y)di,  -  is positively corre- 
lated the di,  -  ,.  Previous work using this model has overestimated experi- 
ence dependence for two reasons.  First, the coefficient on the once 
lagged di,  inevitably reflects not only experience dependence but also 
Markov persistence.  Second, because the coefficient on dit_l  is con- 
strained to equality across individuals, the y,-  also captures some Mar- 
kov-type persistence. Heterogeneity has simply not been properly con- 
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The continuous model described at the beginning of  this section also 
inadvertently captures some Markov-type persistence in the state de- 
pendence parameter. Suppose weeks worked is the dependent variable. 
Then it is tempting to regard tij as the expected weeks worked in year t 
given an individual’s two escape probabilities.  However, even in the 
presence of  Markov persistence alone, the individual’s expected weeks 
worked will be greater if  he begins the period working than if  he enters 
without work. A preceding year’s  weeks worked help predict the person’s 
state at the end of that year and therefore at the start of the current year. 
Anyone who worked fifty-two weeks in year t + 1  was working at the start 
of year t. He will certainly be expected to have more weeks worked in 
year t than an identical individual who begins year t out of work. Even 
conditional on Si,  weeks worked in one year are correlated with weeks 
worked in the  next because they help predict the person’s state at the start 
of  the next period. The correct model is thus 
Yit = 6i + *jbj, + yYit- 1 + uj, 
where bit is now a dummy variable capturing the person’s state at the 
beginning of  year  t.  In this model  tii and  +j  are reflective of  the two 
Markov  escape  probabilities  and  y  is a  measure  of  true  experience 
dependence. Even if we know Si  with certainty, we could not estimate this 
equation because Jlj varies with each individual and is highly correlated 
with bit and Yjt-  1. 
When we difference, however, the advantages of  this continuous for- 
mulation become clearer: 
Yit -  Yit -  I = Mbit -  bit -  I) + dyit -  1 -  Yit -  2) 
+ uj, -  uj,  ~  1 
There is only a bias problem for persons who change their beginning state 
from one period to the next. Otherwise (bit -  b, -  1) = 0 and +i  vanishes. 
One cannot estimate the equation for these persons only because bit is 
correlated with Ujt  -  and conditioning on it will introduce bias.3  But in 
the present sample, nearly 90% of  all persons are observed in the same 
state at the start of  any two consecutive years, so the bias on y may be 
quite small. 
Including bit -  bit -  (using bit -  as an instrument) will reduce the bias 
but will not fully eliminate it. At the same time y will not fully capture 
experience dependence because tij and +i are average yearly probabilities 
which will in part reflect some experience dependence if  the underlying 
forces of escape are high. In the presence of  these offsetting “biases,” I 
regard y  as a rough measure of  experience dependence. Any better 
measures require complete work histories and present serious methodo- 
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In this continuous model, identification was achieved with the imposi- 
tion  of  three  important  restrictions:  air  = ai,  $it = $i  and  Cov(  Uit, 
Ui,-  1) = 0. If  any of  these restrictions are false, spurious.  state depen- 
dence can be generated. Probably the most serious concern for this group 
is nonstationarity of the individual components  ai and +i. If weeks worked 
is the endogenous variable,  ai and +i  might be seen  as that  part  of 
maturity, ability, or labor force attachment not captured by the Xs. Since 
these may grow or decay over time, it seem3 desirable to free up the 
individual components. Although we cannot let the components decay or 
grow at different rates, a model allowing tji,  = A,6,  and +it  =  can be 
estimated using four years of  data. We solve for ai  in  the third year 
equations and substitute it into the fourth: 
Yi3 =  A36j +  A3+ibi3  + y3Yi2 +  Xi3133 + Ui3 
1 
6i = -  *ibi3 + - (Yi3 -  y3Yt2 -  xi3133 -  Uj3) 
A3 
so 
Substituting into the equation for Yi4 
h  A 
A3  A3 
xi4  134 -  -4  xi3133 + ui4 -  -4  ui3 
The effects of  the first term have been discussed earlier. The only other 
problem is that Yi3  is correlated with the error term, Yil  is not however, 
and serves as a natural instrument for Yi3.  If we constrain y4 = y3 we can 
obtain estimates of  y and A4/A3 although we cannot tell which is which 
since they enter the equation symmetrically. 
The restriction  Cov(Vi,, 17,-  1) = 0 helps to highlight an important 
distinction between state dependence and serial correlation. fn the ab- 
sence of  strong Xs  which change over time, there is  no meaningful 
empirical distinction between serial correlation and state dependence. 
However, in the presence of Xs the distinction is important. State de- 
pendence implies that a change in X will cause a change in Y not only in 
the present  period but  in future periods as well, because the initial 
increase in Y  induces future increases in Y. If  serial correlation is present, 
a change in X will have its full force immediately, with no damped 
response into the future. In the case of  unemployment, one might ask 
whether a weak labor market now induces more unemployment in the 
future even when the labor market regains its strength. If  the answer is 
yes, then state dependence may be present. Otherwise, state dependence 
probably is not present. Unfortunately, it is likely to be virtually impossi- 
ble to capture both serial correlation and a nonstationarity of individual 
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that both serial correlation and nonstationarity are captured using a time 
specific coefficient on the individual effect. These models then were used 
to estimate the long-run effects of  unemployment. 
10.2.1  Empirical Results 
Before performing the more complicated tests for state dependence 
described above, we might try to find “natural experiments” which would 
reveal it much more simply. Local unemployment rates vary dramatically 
over time and across locales. One natural experiment would be to test 
whether persons who enter a weak labor market which later turns strong 
fare less well than those who enter a strong market which remains strong. 
A unique feature of  the “Parnes data” is the availability of  an area 
unemployment rate for most persons in each year. The rate for small local 
areas about the size of  an SMSA was  derived from a twelve-month 
average of monthly local unemployment rates from the Current Popula- 
tion Survey. Presumably the area unemployment is only slightly corre- 
lated with individual effects, so with a few controls for individual charac- 
teristics, we might simply test the importance of  lagged unemployment 
rate in equations with both current and lagged unemployment rates. If 
entering a weak labor market left long-term scars, then the lagged rate 
should be negative and significant. Unfortunately, the area rate behaved 
very poorly. Even in equations without the lagged rate, the coefficient on 
the current rate, though usually of the correct sign, was rarely significant 
and was highly unstable. When the lagged rate was included, the results 
were invariably insignificant  and occasionally  even the sign on the current 
rate was perverse. 
Even though the area rates performed poorly on this data, this experi- 
ment should be performed on other samples if  possible. Ultimately, a 
conclusion resting on such a simple methodology would be the most 
compelling test for the long-run effects of short-run macr~policy.~ 
The techniques described in the previous section were applied to weeks 
worked and to weeks unemployed. Weeks worked were chosen over 
weeks not worked only because they seem conceptually easier to deal 
with. Obviously since weeks not worked are simply fifty-two less weeks 
worked, the results would be identical except for the constant term and a 
sign change on the coefficients of the exogenous variables if  the alterna- 
tive variable was used. There were 298 observations in the final sample. 
There is a purely statistical problem associated with the use of  the 
various controls for heterogeneity in equations predicting weeks worked 
or  weeks unemployed. Both are limited dependent variables; they cannot 
exceed fifty-two or fall below zero. The importance of  the problem is 
most evident in the case of  weeks worked. As weeks worked approach 
fifty-two the estimate of state dependence will approach zero if  controls 
are made for heterogeneity. Statistically, the limited variable will induce 368  David T.  Ellwood 
an artifically negative correlation between once lagged weeks and the 
error term. The results follows from the fact that if  lagged weeks are 
large, the positive end of the distribution of the error term is likely to be 
truncated. Intuitively, once weeks worked approach fifty-two,  regardless 
of the true strength of state dependence, the next years’ weeks cannot be 
pushed above fifty-two. This problem is of greater concern in later years 
when more and more of the young men approach fifty-two weeks employ- 
ment. There are well-known methodologies to correct truncated depen- 
dent variables. These typically do not apply to situations where a lagged 
dependent variable is correlated with the error term for reasons other 
than truncation.  Heterogeneity further complicates the problem.  No 
attempt was made to develop the appropriate truncation corrections for 
these equations. If we view the solution to the truncation problem as the 
inclusion of a truncation correction variable, the problem is unlikely to be 
particularly acute in the difference equations. In these situations only the 
change in the truncation variable is omitted, and these changes will be 
relatively  small,  particularly  as  persons  approach  fifty-two  weeks. 
Actually, persons who remain at fifty-two weeks in all three years impart 
no bias at all in the absence of  exogenous variables. They simply provide 
no information since yit -  yit  -  = 0  .5 
The wage rate normally appears in labor supply equations. At the same 
time human capital theory suggests that work experience will be associ- 
ated with higher wages as individuals invest in on-the-job training. To 
prevent the wage variable from capturing any effects of increased invest- 
ment, the variable LW, reflects the wage at the beginning of  period  1 
while WW,  equals weeks worked during year t. To eliminate potential 
bias, the various equations (because weeks worked in year t-1  and 
therefore U,  -  alters the wage in year t)  the wage variables were always 
instrumented with LW,, -  and LW,, - in equations controlling for heter- 
ogeneity. All strictly exogenous variables are measured at the beginning 
of  each period. 
Table 10.7 presents the results of  regressions of  weeks worked and 
weeks unemployed on the once lagged counterparts. The only correction 
for heterogeneity is the inclusion of  a few personal characteristics like 
age, race, and level of schooling. As anticipated, lagged values of weeks 
worked  and weeks unemployed  have sizeable coefficients and small 
standard errors. As in previous examples in this paper the results for 
weeks worked are far more stable than those for weeks unemployed. 
When all years are estimated as a system and the coefficient on lagged 
weeks unemployed is constrained to equality over all three years, the 
coefficient is .27;  the coefficient on weeks worked, .39. The results again 
suggest substantial persistence of  early experience. Still, even without 
controlling for heterogeneity, the coefficient on weeks unemployed is 
low. Even if this were the correct estimate of state dependence, a twenty- 369  Teenage Unemployment: Permament Scars or Temporary Blemishes? 
six-week spell of  unemployment would induce just two extra weeks of 
unemployment  two years later. An equal spell without work  would 
induce a four-week spell two years later according to these results. With 
appropriate corrections for heterogeneity, state dependence estimates 
should fall to even lower levels. 
One control  for heterogeneity is differencing. This eliminates any 
stationary person effects. The second is to include the state at the begin- 
ning of each period. Difference equation results are displayed on tables 
10.8 and 10.9. In equations (1) and (2),  twice lagged weeks unemployed 
and weeks employed, and once lagged lag wage, and beginning state 
dummies, serve as the principle instruments to the lagged differences on 
weeks unemployed, weeks worked, lag wage, and beginning states re- 














Age at start of  year t. 
Area unemployment rate at start of  year t. 
Race dummy (1 = nonwhite). 
Employment dummy (1 = employed) at start of  year t. 
Log of  wage at start of  year t. 
Marriage dummy (1 = married) at start of  year t. 
Years of  school completed. 
SMSA dummy (1 = resides in SMSA) at start of  year t. 
South dummy (1 = resides in South) at start of  year t. 
Unemployment dummy (1 = unemployed) at start of  year t. 
Weeks worked in year t. 
Weeks unemployed in year 1. 
Change in variable xxxx. 
Table 10.6  Means and Standard Deviations for Variables Used in Regressions 
Mean  S.D.  Mean  S.D. 
AGE 2  18.8  1.98  SMSA 3  .664  .473 
AREA 2  4.33  1.72  SMSA 4  .668  .472 
AREA 3  4.22  1.85  SOUTH 2  .446  ,497 
AREA 4  4.59  1.93  SOUTH 3  .432  ,496 
BLACK  .383  .487  SOUTH 4  ,422  ,495 
EM 2  399  ,301  UN 2  .060  ,238 
EM 3  .932  .251  UN 3  .a50  .219 
EM4  .946  ,225  UN 4  ,037  .189 
LW2  .673  .491  WW1  43.4  12.77 
LW3  326  .442  ww2  45.2  11.45 
LW4  .947  .433  ww3  47.1  9.78 
MAR 2  .292  ,455  ww4  47.2  10.64 
MAR 3  .446  .498  WUN 1  2.53  6.28 
MAR 4  .507  ,500  WUN 2  2.88  7.27 
SCHOOL  11.2  1.51  WUN 3  2.33  6.33 
SMSA 2  .634  .482  WUN 4  2.41  7.44 370  David T. Ellwood 
Table 10.7  Regressions of Weeks Worked and Weeks 
Unemployed on Once-lagged Values 
Dependent Variables 
Weeks worked  Weeks unemployed 
ww4  ww3  ww2  WUN4  WUN,  WUNZ 
(t=4)  (t =  3)  (t=2)  (t=4)  (t=3)  (t=2) 
BLACK  -  .442 
(1.31) 
SCHOOL  ,348 
(.431) 
(.326) 
AGE,  .140 
SMSA,  -2.55 
SOUTH,  -  ,082 
(1.33) 
(1.38) 
MAR,  2.94 
AREA,  .193 
(.308) 
LWI  .686 




WUNt- 1  - 
SEE  9.54 
,596  -1.54 
(1.16)  (1.40) 
.239  .541 
(.384)  (.450) 
,048  .442 
(.293)  (.355) 
-1.78  .910 
(1.19)  (1.37) 
.298  3.48 
(1.26)  (2.33) 
.667  1.45 
(1.09)  (1.43) 
-  .236  -  ,464 
(.291)  (.372) 
2.54  1.31 
(1.54)  (1.49) 
.399  ,354 
(.046)  (.049) 
-  - 
8.44  10.1 
.370 
-  .364 
(.310) 






-  .768 
-  1.25 
(  ,875) 
-  ,148 
(.222) 







-  .497 
(.278) 
-  .369 
(.211) 
-  .331 
















-  .073 
,005 
(  .242) 
1.08 
(.  932) 
(.  306) 
-  2.23 
(1.03) 










.13  ~~  R2  .23  .28  .25  .18  ~. 
spectively  . The equations also include changes in residence,  marital 
status, and area unemployment rate. The personal characteristic vari- 
ables remain to capture any systematic changes in the dependent vari- 
ables. 
Efficiency can be gained, however, with the use of  three stage least 
squares because both error terms contain the residuals from the third 
year.  Equations  (3) and  (4)  are the unconstrained  three stage least 
squares results. For these equations weeks worked and weeks unem- 
ployed in the first year were used as the primary instruments. Finally, in 
equation (5) the coefficients on all variables shown were constrained to 
equality across the two years. 
The results in the unemployment equations are quite striking. All 
evidence  of  state dependence is  eliminated.  The coefficients on the 
lagged change in weeks unemployed are rarely positive and never signifi- 
cant. Indeed, there is even a hint in the results of  negative state depen- 
dence. Persons with unusually high unemployment one year will have 
unusually low unemployment the next. Note also the poor performance 
of the change in beginning state dummies, DUN,. The standard errors are 371  Teenage Unemployment: Permament Scars or Temporary Blemishes? 
always quite high and in four of five cases the sign is incorrect. Very few 
persons change states, so DUN, is virtually always zero and its coefficient 
is derived using instiumental variables. These facts no doubt explain a 
large part of  the perverse results.  Nonetheless,  there appears to be 
relatively little Markov persistence in unemployment not captured by ai. 
Even without controlling for nonstationarity or serial correlation then, 
persistence of unemployment-as  distinguished from nonemployment- 
can be entirely attributed to  heterogeneity rather than state dependence. 
The results for weeks worked are quite different. Although corrections 
for heterogeneity substantially reduce the coefficient on the lagged de- 
pendent variable, some experience dependence remains. The experience 
dependence parameter varies from .08 to .19 across years and specifica- 
tions. In the constrained 3SLS equation its value is .13 and is nearly twice 
its standard error in spite of being derived using instrumental variables. 
Unless the results are due to serial correlation, this coefficient indicates 
that persons who work  an extra thirty  weeks one year will work an 
additional four during the next as a direct result of this extra employment. 
There is also strong evidence for the presence of Markov persistence. 
On average, persons who are working at the beginning of  a year are 
expected to work five weeks more in that year than if  they are out of 
Table 10.8  Difference Equation Results for Weeks  Unemployed 
Method and dependent variable 
Constrained 
NB  3SLSb  3SLSb 
(1)  (2)  (3)  (4)  (5) 
Variable  DWUN4  DWUN3  DWUN4  DWUN,  DWUN4 DWUN3 
DSMSA,  -4.51  0.28  -4.41  0.48  -  1.89 
DSOUTH,  -  2.75  2.18  -2.89  2.07  -  0.26 
(1.78)  (1.94)  (1.88)  (1.94)  (1.29) 
(4.99)  (4.61)  (4.91)  (4.59)  (3.32) 
DMAR,  -0.43  1.30  -  0.78  1.33  0.69 
(1.57)  (1.24)  (1.65)  (1.24)  (0.97) 
(0.36)  (0.46)  (0.38)  (0.46)  (0.28) 
(3.07)  (2.20)  (5.15)  (1.99)  (1.77) 
DAREA,  -0.68  0.06  -  0.64  0.07  -0.35 
DLW,  7.34  1.12  7.24  0.51  1.15 
D UN,  2.06  -  2.45  -2.21  -2.14  -  1.39 
(2.67)  (2.20)  (6.99)  (2.20)  (2.04) 
DWUNt-I  -0.05  -0.002  -0.09  0.001  -0.04 
(0.07)  (0.102)  (0.07)  (0.10)  (0.09) 
NOTE: Standard  errors in  parentheses.  All equations  include  year  dummies,  AGm, 
BLACK, and SCHOOL. 
"Instruments include all past and future values of  WW-2,  WUN,-,. 
Instruments include all past and future values of  SMSA, SOUTH, MAR, AREA, WW,, 
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Table 10.9  Difference Equation Results for Weeks Worked 
Method and dependent variable 
Constrained 
IV"  3SLSb  3SLSb 
(1)  (2)  (3)  (4)  (5) 
Variable  DWW,  DWW,  DWW,  DWW,  DWW4DWW3 
DSMSA,  4.36  4.54  5.61  3.77  3.97 
(2.66)  (2.60)  (2.75)  (2.58)  (1.79) 
(7.50)  (6.17)  (7.18)  (6.10)  (4.56) 
(2.36)  (1.68)  (2.40)  (1.67)  (1.35) 
(0.53)  (0.62)  (0.54)  (0.62)  (0.39) 
(4.54)  (2.68)  (7.72)  (2.65)  (2.39) 
DSOUTH,  13.75  1.64  15.57  1.75  7.31 
DMAR,  -0.69  -  1.75  0.76  -  1.59  -  1.22 
DAREA,  0.47  -0.12  0.48  -0.12  0.25 
DLW,  1.06  -  1.98  -3.14  -  1.06  -0.54 
DEM,  3.54  4.92  3.75  5.34  4.63 
DWWr-1  0.19  0.12  0.08  0.14  0.13 
(3.18)  (2.40)  (7.35)  (2.39)  (2.22) 
(0.10)  (0.08)  (0.25)  (0.08)  (0.07) 
NOTE:  Standard errors in  parentheses.  All  equations  include  year  dummies,  AGE?, 
BLACK, and SCHOOL. 
"Instruments include all past and future values of  SMSA, SOUTH, MAR, AREA, WW,-,, 
bInstruments include all past and future values of  SMSA, SOUTH, MAR, AREA, WW,, 
WUN,, LW,, EM2. 
WUNt-2,  LW,_,,  EMt-,. 
work. Excluding this parameter does seriously upward bias the experi- 
ence dependence parameter. In the constrained 3SLS equation with this 
omitted, the dependence parameter is 0.21. 
In sharp contrast to the results for unemployment, then, controls for 
heterogeneity do not eliminate the experience dependence estimate and 
the beginning state variable performs well. This is perhaps the most 
conclusive evidence that the retrospective unemployment rates have little 
meaning. Unemployment as measured here does not beget unemploy- 
ment. Nonemployment begets nonemployment. Or, even more convin- 
cingly, employment begets employment. The results suggest real gains 
from work. 
One disappointment in the results is the poor showing  of the exogenous 
variables. Most were insignificant in the constrained three-stage equa- 
tions. The SMSA, SOUTH, and MAR variables were not expected to 
perform well since few persons moved or got married. But the perform- 
ance of the area variable was unanticipated. Its sign was often incorrect; 
its magnitude was usually low; and its standard error was always high. 
The lack of  strong exogenous variables prevents certain isolation of serial 
correlation and state dependence.  It is possible that the results  are 
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effects. Corrections for nonstationarity, however, should capture much 
of  the effects of  serial correlation. 
A second surprise was the very weak performance of  the wage in all 
equations and specifications. Even in the equations that do not control 
for heterogeneity (table 10.7),  the coefficients  on LW,  are quite small and 
never  significant-at  most  a  10%  increase  in wage  increases weeks 
worked by a trifling two days! In the difference equations, the standard 
errors are inevitably quite high and most signs are incorrect. Using the 
change in wage rather than the absolute level does little to improve the 
performance of  this measure.  Although perplexing,  these results are 
strongly verified in the next section. Measured wage, of course, may be 
quite different from potential wage if  the youngster is investing in on-the- 
job training. 
Nonstationarity, because of some forms of serial correlation or changes 
in work attachment, might be a source of  serious bias in the results. 
Sharply changing employment rates resulting from rising or decaying 
heterogeneity unrelated to employment could be spuriously picked up as 
experience dependence. Including age, race, marital status, and an inter- 
cept in the difference equations captures systematic changes and helps to 
minimize the problem. Corrections for nonstationarity require four years 
of  data. Thus nonstationarity can only be tested between the third and 
fourth years. 
Table 10.10 presents the results for weeks unemployed and weeks 
worked designed to isolate the effects of  nonstationarity and state de- 
pendence.  Once  again  the  unemployment  equation  behaves  badly, 
WUN3  failing even to change sign. The weeks-worked equation, how- 
ever, performs surprisingly  well. Although the standard error in the twice 
lagged weeks worked is large, so too is its magnitude. The coefficients 
imply a nonstationarity parameter (ratio of the individual effects in years 
three  and four)  of  0.76 and a state dependence parameter  of  0.11. 
(Although the specification allows either parameter to be 0.76 or 0.11, it 
is clear from context which is which.) The heterogeneity parameter does 
show some decay (capturing some serial correlation no doubt), but the 
experience dependence parameter is nearly identical to that derived in 
the constrained 3SLS specification. 
This analysis illustrates the critical importance of controlling for heter- 
ogeneity. Controls eliminated all of  the apparent state dependence in 
unemployment equations, They reduced by two-thirds the dependence 
parameter in the weeks-worked equations. Previous studies, which used 
only additional demographic variables to control for heterogeneity, have 
seriously overstated the true long-term impact of teenage unemployment 
on future labor market performance. 
The conclusion then is that working does have some benefit beyond the 
current year. Someone working an extra thirty weeks in one year will 374  David T. Ellwood 
Table 10.10  Instrumental Variable Equations Allowing Nonstationarity 
of Individual Comwnent 
Dependent variable 
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SMSA 3,  SOUTH4,  SOUTH 3,  MAR  4,  MAR  3,  AREA  4,  AREA  3,  BLACK,  SCHOOL, 
AGE,,  WW2, Wi,  WUN2, WUNI,  LW3, LW2, EM,,  EM,,  UN3, UN2. 
perhaps work an extra four in the next. This result does not distinguish 
between voluntary and involuntary time out of work. Work may improve 
skills, open new options for employment, or simply increase work attach- 
ment. 
Nonetheless, in absolute terms, the long-run impact is relatively small. 
Even thirty weeks out Of work have virtually no impact after one or two 
years. For this group of  youngsters there is no evidence of  a long-term 
cycle of  recurring  periods without  employment induced  by  an  qrly 
episode out of work-experience  dependence yes, but a serious “perma- 
nent scar,” no. 
These estimates are not perfect. There are potential biases in both 
directions. Nevertheless, I find the evidence that teenage nonemploy- 
ment exhibits short-term state dependence quite compelling. There are, 
however, three important caveats. First, this evidence is for a group of 
teenagers who entered the labor force in extremely favorable tines. In 
this period it may have been the case that jobs were readily available for 
most youngsters. The seventies have brought a substantially worse job 
outlook. In this environment the effects of employment and the lack of it 
may be very different, Second, this is not a random sample of  young 
persons. Some of  the long term nonemployed may have been excluded 
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out of work. Finally, the sample here is too small to separate effects on 
specific groups. It may be that one can isolate stronger effects among 
blacks or low income persons. 
These concerns notwithstanding, the current evidence is clear. Teen- 
age nonemployment has real but short-lived adverse effects on teenage 
employment prospects. 
10.3  The Impact of Work Experience on Wages 
The second potential cost of being out of work is that the lost experi- 
ence will translate into reduced wages. In the long run, reduced wages 
could be a far more important cost of  unemployment. Lost experience 
could travel with the worker over his life. Each job may  serve as a 
stepping stone to another. Lost experience at least delays the start of the 
young worker’s climb. Worse, it may track the worker into a less desir- 
able chain of jobs. This final section attempts to separate the cost of lost 
experience from differences in individual earning capacity correlated 
with work experience. 
Assessing the true impact of work experience in a particular year apart 
from heterogeneity is a very complex problem. The triangular structure 
of wages whereby work experience influences wages which in turn in- 
fluences future work experience, in combination with the direct experi- 
ence dependence from work experience, creates a hopelessly tangled 
collection of heterogeneity terms with coefficients  which vary over time. 
The problems can best be understood by starting with a multiequation 
system. Let LWiI  be the natural log of wages of individual  i at the start of 
year t, Xi?  a vector of exogenous variables, and WWit  be weeks worked in 
year t. One model of  wages and employment is: 
I- 1 
L Wit  =  Xi& +  C.  at?  - Wit  - + hi, +  (1)  J=1 
(2)  WWi,  =  XiIRt +  ~r  Wit  -  1 +  w,L  Wjr + 6iI 
+  *itbit  + uit 
Here equation (1) is just a straightforward human capital-type wage 
equation; equation (2) is just the labor supply relation from the previous 
section. Xi, is a heterogeneity term in the wage equation, Sit and qiI  are the 
individual components in the weeks-worked model. Note that aIr-j  is 
almost certainly not going to be constant across weeks worked in dif- 
ferent years since the flattening profile suggests diminished investment 
over time. 
Only lagged weeks worked appear in the wage equation. Thus the 
system is triangular and a reduced form equation can be derived in a 
straightforward fashion. If  we assume Air = hi,  tiit = ai,  and qir  = qi  and if 376  David T. Ellwood 
we condition on Wil,  the reduced form equation will have the following 
form. 
The coefficient on Wil  in the correctly estimated reduced-form equa- 
tion captures the full impact of early unemployment on the wage in year t. 
Previous authors have estimated equations of  this type in the past but 
have included few controls for heterogeneity or Markov persistence. 
The reduced-form equation helps point out the dual biases present in 
OLS estimation of  this equation. Early experience may be correlated 
with the individual component in wages, Xi (“ability”), upward biasing 
the coefficient on mil.  This bias grows over time because  Xi affects 
wages each year which alters future weeks worked which in turn in- 
fluences future wages. At the same time, early experience is correlated 
with later experience in part because of  the individual components of 
experience, Si, ‘Pi (“work attachment” and “ease of finding a job”). Since 
experience yields positive benefits, the coefficient on WWil is further 
biased because early experience inappropriately captures some of  the 
effects of  later experience. This effect also grows over time; each year 
brings new experience correlated with first year’s experience. (In prac- 
tice, of  course, most workers eventually hit roughly fifty-two weeks of 
employment each year so the correlation is not perpetual.) Thus previous 
estimates of the long-term impacts of early employment experience may 
be severely biased. One other feature of  the equation should be noted. 
The equation includes all Xs between year 2 and year t.  Exclusion of these 
is yet another source of  potential bias. 
Yet even this rather complicated model leaves much to be desired. 
Human  capital  theories  suggest that  persons  may  select  differently 
shaped profiles. Persons with early unemployment and nonemployment 
may have flatter schedules. Blue-collar workers have slower wage growth 
than their white-collar counterparts. If  the return to experience is system- 
atically lower for persons lacking some early work experience, the coef- 
ficient will  be further biased upward. Similarly, the individual compo- 
nents may not be stationary over time, introducing even more bias. 
Even ignoring the inadequacies with the current model, however, it is 
virtually impossible to get consistent estimates of the coefficient on weeks 
worked in the first  year.  Simple differencing does not  eliminate the 
heterogeneity components since the coefficients  on all are changing over 
time. Equally troubling, mil  is fixed over time. Differencing yields only 
the change in its coefficient, not its overall magnitude. The only hope for 
estimation is to find an instrument correlated with mil  but partially 
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unemployment rate in year 1. It is not currently in the equations and the 
inclusion of race and residence dummies along with schooling may elim- 
inate most of its correlation with the individual effects. Unfortunately, we 
have already seen that the area rate performed poorly in weeks-worked 
equations. Thus it is an unlikely instrument. 
Although isolation of  the full long-term impact of  nonemployment in 
this data set is infeasible then, a more modest attempt can be made to 
isolate the impact of heterogeneity. Let us concentrate solely on  equation 
(l),  the regression of  log wages on an individual constant and weeks 
worked in previous years.  If  we treat weeks worked in  each year as 
exogenous, then simple differencing eliminates the nuisance parameter 
and leaves the last weeks-worked parameter intact. Thus 
I-1 
LW,, = XitrYI  +  aIi  -  jWWiI  - + hi +  &if  (1)  ]=1 
+ a, -  1 Ww,-  1 +  &it-  &it-  1 
As long as the weeks worked are strictly exogenous, a,,  -  1, the coef- 
ficient on the weeks worked in year t -  1  represents its impact in that 
year. One can also difference wages separated by two years. In that case, 
the coefficients on the last two years of  experience could be captured. 
The exogeneity assumption, however, is highly suspect. Even if  we 
assume that WW,  -  was uncorrelated with  the presence of LW, -  in 
the  labor  supply  equation  determining  WW,  -  guarantees  that 
Cov(  WWi,  -  1, Eit -  1) >  0. OLS estimates of  the difference equation will 
then understate the true impact of WW,  on wages. In the previous labor 
supply results the coefficient on L  W,  -  was often small, occasionally of 
wrong sign, and invariably insignificant. Still, without stronger evidence 
of exogeneity, we must be concerned that OLS estimates will be biased. 
There are two reasonable approaches to this problem.  First, Sims 
(1972) has suggested a very simple methodology to test for exogeneity: 
simply regress the dependent variable on all past and future values of the 
independent variable. Strict exogeneity in the absence of  heterogeneity 
implies that the coefficient on future values will be zero; those on past 
values, nonzero. If causality is unidirectional, past values of the indepen- 
dent variable will  influence the  dependent  variable,  but  the current 
dependent variable will not influence future values of  the independent 
variables.  Unfortunately,  even if  the independent variable is  strictly 
exogenous, in the presence of heterogeneity the expectation of the future 
coefficients will be nonzero if  the future values are correlated with any 
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(see Chamberlain [1979]). The common-sense notion is that any variable 
partially correlated with an omitted stationary heterogeneity term will 
have a nonzero coefficient even in equations where the variable would 
otherwise have a zero coefficient, because it will be serving as a proxy for 
the omitted variable. If  weeks worked in year 2 is capturing heterogeneity 
in the year 2 wage equation, it ought to capture the same heterogeneity in 
year  1. Essentially,  Sims’s is a test for true casuality as opposed to 
spurious correlation due to endogeneity or omitted variables. 
If, as seems likely,  the Sims test fails, we  are forced to seek  an 
instrument for Wit-  ,  in equation (1’). If  we assume that impact work 
experience in some year j  raises wages in years t -  1 and t by a equal 
amount, ag  = a,  -  lj and we can withdraw WWij  from the equation and use 
it to instrument WW,,.  for instance, might serve as an effective 
instrument. 
Many authors have previously sought to remove heterogeneity  or 
“ability”  bias  from  wage  equations  (see, for example,  Chamberlain 
[1978a], Griliches and Mason [1972]). These efforts typically were not 
aimed at deriving the coefficient on  work experience as distinct from age, 
nor did they focus particularly on the very early years of  experience. 
Nonetheless it would be surprising in light of all the previous efforts if we 
did not find a substantial effect of  work experience on wages. 
10.3.1  Empirical Results in Wage Equations 
To roughly replicate previous studies of the effects of  unemployment 
on wages, wage equations were first estimated for 1975 and 1973  with no 
experience variables included other than weeks worked in the first year. 
The data base was the same sample of young men who left high school in 
1965 to 1967. The results were similar to those reported by other authors. 
The coefficient on WW, was .00452 on 1975 and .00478 in 1973. Both 
coefficients were quite significant. If  the values actually reflect the true 
effect of early nonemployment on future wages, the impact is staggering. 
Youngsters missing out on twenty-six weeks of employment experience 
in their first year out of  school are left with 12% lower wages even ten 
years later. Accumulated over a lifetime, the cost could be enormous. 
These results are not purged of heterogeneity, of course. The large size of 
the possible losses thus makes the separation of  the true impact quite 
important. 
At the very least, the results do  show dramatic persistence in wages for 
persons with early time not employed. Even if  nonemployment had no 
important impact of its own, early unemployment can be used to single 
out persons who will do poorly in the future. They could be the recipients 
of special aid. The result is also important because it suggests that early 
experience could be used as a signal of  “quality” or “ability” by  em- 
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what happened in 1966, but employers in 1967 or 1968 might have, and 
employers in 1969 might have looked back to 1968, and so forth. In a 
market with great uncertainty, those persons who genuinely tried but 
failed to get work may be inadvertently classed as poor workers. It may 
take these workers some real time to recover from this early adverse 
signal. 
The issue at hand, however, is whether this early experience or lack 
thereof actually has ill effects. The previous section described why the 
only possible hope of capturing the very long-term effects was with an 
effective instrument on WW1. The area unemployment rate in year 1  was 
suggested. As expected, however, instrumental variable equations be- 
haved poorly. The results were erratic; standard errors very high. Thus I 
chose to focus more narrowly on the effects of experience in the first four 
years of  experience. 
Table 10.11 presents regression results of  wages at the end of each of 
the first four full years out of  school as a function of weeks worked in 
previous years. These were estimated as seemingly unrelated equations 
Table 10.11  Wage Equations for the First Four Years out of School 
Dependent variables 
LWAGEZ  LWAGE,  LWAGE,  LWAGEs 
(t=2)  (t =  3)  (t=4)  (t =  5) 
SCHOOL  .040  ,051  .046  .060 
(.017)  (.014)  (.015)  (.014) 
AGE2  .040  ,038  ,018  .027 
(.017)  (.011)  C012)  (.011) 
(.053)  (.045)  (.048)  (.045) 
SOUTH,  -  .275  -  .218  -  .197  -  .264 
(  .055)  (.045)  (.047)  (.044) 
AREA,  .010  .005  -  .003  -  .012 
(.013)  (.009)  (.008)  (.007) 
wwl  .0030  .0036  ,0034  ,0049 
m2  -  ,0028  .0035  ,0010 
(.0018)  (.0021)  (.0020) 
(.0020)  (.0022) 
BLACK  -  .114  -  .125  -  .124  -  .070 
SMSA,  ,135  .145  .171  ,138 
(  ,048)  (.039)  (.041)  (.038) 
MAR,  .078  .lo5  ,078  .085 
(.046)  (.033)  (.035)  (.034) 
(.OO19)  (.0017)  (.0019)  (.OO17) 
ww3  -  -  .OO43  ,0019 
-  -  -  ,0017  ww4 
INTERCEPT  -  .675  -  .742  -  .433  -  .487 
(.OO17) 
(.258)  (.221)  (.237)  (  .226) 
NOTE:  All equations estimated as seemingly unrelated equations. 380  David T. Ellwood 
since the error terms will almost certainly be correlated. With only 271 
observations, the results are plagued by  rather high standard errors. 
Nonetheless, the coefficients on past weeks worked are quite sizable. 
Furthermore, the results seem quite stable until year 4  when collinearity 
seems to be excessive. The numbers suggest that each year of experience 
is associated with a 10 to 20% wage increase in these first four years. 
Although reserving some concern for the low significance of  some esti- 
mates,  I shall concentrate on determining whether  these high  point 
estimates appear to be the result of heterogeneity or state dependence. 
The Sims test for true causality is to include future work experience in 
current wage equations. Strict exogeneity implies zero coefficients on 
future variables so that the coefficients on WW2,  WW,, and WW4 would 
be zero in the LW, regression; WW3  and WW4 in the L  W3  regression, and 
so forth. (Recall that LW, is wage at the beginning of year tor  end of year 
t -  1). Table 10.12 displays wage equations for years 2, 3, and 4, when 
weeks worked in years 1  to 4 are included in each regression. The results 
are striking. In spite of  a high degree of multicollinearity, in each of  the 
equations the coefficients on past experiences remain strongly positive. 
The coefficients  on future experience tend to be small or of incorrect sign. 
Incredibly, neither endogeneity nor heterogeneity may seriously bias the 
coefficients on WW2,  WW3 or W4.  A likelihood ratio test that the 
coefficients  on future values are zero is not rejected. Twice the natural log 
of the likelihood ratio is 7.7, while the critical value of  x2 (6) is 12.6. A 
similar test that the coefficients  on past values are zero is overwhelmingly 
rejected (likelihood ratio = 126.3). 
This evidence for the one-way causality of weeks worked on wages is 
quite surprising, although the very weak performance of the wage vari- 
ables in the labor supply equation portended this exogeneity. The mini- 
mal bias resulting from heterogeneity is perhaps even more remarkable. 
Table 10.12  Wage Equations with Weeks Worked in First Four Years 
Included in AU Renressions" 
Dependent variables 
LWAGEz  LWAGE,  LWAGE, 
(t  =  2)  (t  =  3)  (t  =  4) 
WW1  .0031  .0036  .0034 
(.0021)  (.0018)  (.OO19) 
ww2  -  .0005  ,0025  .0032 
(.OO26)  (.0022)  (.OO23) 
ww3  ,0014  ,0014  ,0047 
(.0031)  (.OO26)  (.OO2S) 
ww4  -  ,0019  -  .0015  .o009 
(.0026)  (.0022)  (.OO24) 
"All equations include SCHOOL,  AGE,, BLACK, SMSA,, SOUTH,, MAR,, AREA,. All 
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It should be remembered though, that these results in no way indicate 
that heterogeneity is absent. They  show instead  that the portion  of 
heterogeneity correlated with WW2,  WW, and WW4 is fully captured by 
WW1, SCHOOL, AGE, and the other controls. The coefficients on these 
latter variables are presumably biased by the presence of heterogeneity. 
The very powerful conclusion from this exercise is that, at least in these 
four years, the coefficients  are  a good reflection of the causal relationship 
between experience and wages. Not surprisingly, the difference results 
confirm these findings. Differencing eliminates any stationary effects 
correlated with weeks worked. If  heterogeneity were a serious problem, 
we should expect the coefficients on work experience accumulated be- 
tween the differenced years’ wages to fall. At the same time, endogeneity 
would induce a negative correlation between this experience and the 
error term, thus causing a further fall. 
Since the coefficients in year 4  showed that multicollinearity may be 
excessive, I will concentrate on the first three years’  wage equations. (The 
results for year 4  are quite similar.) Table 10.13 presents the estimated 
coefficients in three difference equations. In the first column, first-year 
wages are subtracted from those of the second year. The second column 
presents results of  the regressions on the difference in wages between 
years 2 and 3. The final column provides differences between years 3 and 
1. Once again,  the data strongly suggest that heterogeneity  and en- 
dogeneity are relatively small parts of the measured association between 
experience and wages in the second and third years. The impact of weeks 
worked in year 1  is neutralized in all of the difference equations, as would 
be predicted, since the coefficient represents the difference in the effects 
of  experience on wages in two future years. The coefficient on weeks 
worked in the second year is effectively zero in the second equation, 
again as predicted. However, the coefficients on weeks worked in the 
second and third years in equations where those effects were not differ- 
enced out remain quite large. The coefficients are much more stable 
across equations than they were in table 10.11. Their magnitude is, if 
anything, greater and their significance is increased. The results are thus 
highly supportive of a causal relationship between experience and wages. 
The increase in the significance is reassuring that the effects of experience 
are not purely spurious. 
One possible problem may be that we have tested the wrong model. 
Jobs with the highest wage growth may have very stable employment 
requirements.  This model would imply that if  a Sims-type test  were 
performed using the change in wages on the left hand side, future weeks 
worked enter significantly since workers would presumably remain with 
their jobs. Note also that past weeks worked would likely enter signifi- 
cantly since there is a good chance that persons with good jobs now, as 
measured by wage growth, had them in the previous year. Neither result 382  David T. Ellwood 
Table 10.13  DitTerenced Wage Equations" 
Dependent variables 
L  WA  G  E3 -  L  WA  GE,  L  WA  GEd- L WA  G  E3  L WA  G  E4- L  WA  G  E2 
(fl=3, f2=2)  (tl =  4, t, =  3)  (f1=4,  t2=2) 
ww,  .oO02  -  .OOol  .o002 
(.0019)  (.0016)  (.0020) 
ww2  .0035  .m  .wo 
(.0022)  (.0020)  (.OO25) 
ww3  -  .0041  .wo 
(.m1)  (.0021) 
'All  equations  include  SCHOOL,  AGE,,  BLACK,  SMSA,,,  SMSA,,  SOUTH,,, 
SOUTH,,  MARtl,  MARa, AREAtl,  AREA,. All equations estimated as seemingly  unre- 
lated equations. 
was prominent in the data. Moreover, it is quite possible that the largest 
single year wage changes will be associated with job changes. Presum- 
ably, some young men find new jobs offering better pay. The movers 
probably have fewer weeks worked than the stayers. These persons bias 
the results downward. 
The results presented here strongly suggest that in the first few years 
out of school, experience increases wages by as much as 10 to 20% per 
year. The biggest cost of  being out of  work therefore may well be the 
wages. These data do not reveal whether this is the result of  the accu- 
mulation of  general or specific human capital or even if  they merely 
reflect signaling. Nor do they reveal what skills might be gained from 
early experience. They do reveal, however, that lost work experience 
really can be quite costly. 
These data do not allow good tests for a catch-up effect. It is possible 
that the loss in wages due to previously lost experience is compensated for 
when the individual finally gets a steady job. Interaction terms sifnply 
make the results unstable. This is an important possibility which merits 
attention in future work. 
The results here imply that early experience increases wages by 10 to 
20%. I regard these wage equations as preliminary results requiring 
verification from other sources. Still, they provide surprisingly strong 
evidence that, at least in the short run, work experience really does make 
a difference. Just how long the effect persists requires another analyses. 
Ultimately, the final conclusion awaits the availability of  a good area 
unemployment rate measure so that WW,  can be properly instrumented. 
10.4  Conclusion: Permanent Scars or Temporary Blemishes? 
The first part of this paper examined the early pattern of labor market 
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The early years of  labor market experience are times of  substantial 
change. Employment  rates rise, as do participation rates. There is 
considerable evidence of  weak labor force attachment early in many 
young men’s careers. 
Although the distinction between time out of the labor force and time 
unemployed is conceptually appealing, the division is not accurately 
captured in these retrospective  data. Unemployment  rates behave 
erratically over time for this group. All of  the results in this chapter 
suggest that time not employed is a far better measure of  the labor 
market performance of  young men. 
Even though there is a general improvement in employment rates for 
these young men over time, early labor market patterns persist. Young 
men with poor records early will typically have comparatively poor 
records later. 
The next section revealed that much of the persistence in employment 
Controls  for  heterogeneity  eliminate  at  least  two-thirds  of  the 
observed persistence in employment, but evidence of  experience de- 
pendence remains. That is, even controlling for individual differences 
in the propensity to work, experience dependence remains. However, 
the absolute magnitude of  the effect is small. Even a six-month spell 
out of  work tends to generate only an additional three to four weeks 
out of work one year later. There is no evidence in these data that time 
out of work sets off a long term cycle of recurring “nonemployment.” 
Finally,  the  effect  of  work  experience  on wages  was  examined. 
Apparently,  neither heterogeneity nor endogeneity induce important 
biases in the estimated impact of work experience in the second, third, 
and fourth years out of school on the wages of youngsters in the first few 
years afterward. The impact of early experience on wages is quite large. 
Early work experience has a sizable impact on wages. Controlling for 
individual effects, experience in the second, third, or fourth year out of 
school tends to be associated with wage increases of  between 10 and 
20% a year. 
The data did not allow testing for the possibility of  catch-up, nor for 
testing how long these wage differentials persist. 
There is a strong asymmetry in the problem of isolating the real effects 
of early labor market experience on future employment and wages from 
the differences in wages and employment that are the natural result of 
differences among people within the labor market.  There  are many 
reasons for expecting that unobserved differences among people will be 
correlated both with employment and wages. Thus a finding suggesting 
that early experience has real impact is always suspect. On the other 
hand, a finding of no impact is considered quite convincing since the deck 
patterns could be directly attributed to heterogeneity. 384  David T. Ellwood 
was stacked against such a conclusion. The results in this chapter lead me 
to the former more suspect finding. Early experience really does seem to 
make a difference, particularly on wages. Even after rather elaborate 
controls for heterogeneity, both wages and labor supply seem to be 
directly related to past work experience in the short run, although the 
effects on labor supply are quite small. 
As with all research, many caveats remain. This research was con- 
ducted on a small select sample in a period of tight labor markets, quite 
unlike the present situation. It may be that these findings are peculiar to 
this group or this era. No separate analysis has been done for the central 
city poor. The cleanest experiment-testing  whether past unemployment 
rates predict future wages and employment-could not be performed. 
The ultimate answer to the question of the long-term impact must await 
these results. Until such time as high quality local unemployment data are 
available, we will have to rely on statistical methods of removing heter- 
ogeneity. 
In this group of young men the heavy cost of  time out of work was the 
impact of  the lost work experience on wages. The data do not show 
whether working generates better work habits, or instills general or firm 
specific skills, or even just creates positive signals. Policy makers should 
keep in mind, however, that many forms of public employment may not 
generate the desirable human capital or worker  quality signals. Em- 
ployers may regard public employment quite differently from private 
employment. The challenge for public policy is to design aid programs 
which help young people accumulate the important labor experience, 
rather than simply provide programs which makes the government the 
last-resort employer. 
Notes 
1. Meyer and Wise (chapter 9 of  this volume) report similar results for the National 
Longitudinal Survey of the High School Class of  1972. 
2. Actually, 6,  captures both  the experience dependence from period  t -  1 plus the 
Markov type probability of  remaining in state 1. This is of no serious concern if  the periods 
are short. If  periods are long, asymmetric definition of  periods implies a serious loss of 
efficiency. 
3.  Actually, it can be proven that if we assume complete stationarity (exclude all&),  we 
can  legitimately  test  the  null  hypothesis of  no  state dependence  by  conditioning  on 
4. For one analysis of the long-run performance of  cohorts entering weak labor markets, 
see Plantes (1978). 
5. See Meyer and Wise (chapter  9) for a treatment of  the fifty-two-week truncation 
problem in the absence of  heterogeneity. These authors do not use difference quations. 
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Comment  Robert J. Willis 
Is teenage unemployment a serious social problem? Despite high and 
rising levels of measured unemployment among teenagers, especially 
black teenagers, economists appear to have quite varied opinions about 
the seriousness of the problem. To a considerable degree, I suspect that 
those economists who are least alarmed about teenage unemployment 
tend to concentrate on short-run costs that are borne by the teenager. 
Here the magnitude of the welfare loss of the typical unemployed teen- 
ager appears to be modest because of the dominance of short spells, the 
likelihood of  income protection from his family or from welfare pro- 
grams, and the presumably positive value he attaches to his nonmarket 
time.  Indeed, those who  emphasize the supply-side determinants of 
unemployment might argue that teenage unemployment is high precisely 
because the costs to the teenager of  unemployment are so low. 
Of  course, it  is possible that the short-run social costs of  teenage 
unemployment are  much higher than those costs because of moral hazard 
caused  by  family or social insurance  of  the  teenager’s consumption 
against the risk of unemployment, or because the high private value of his 
nonmarket time is due to the gains from illegal activity. Even in these 
instances, however, it may be argued that teenage unemployment is more 
a symptom than a cause of social problems whose roots lie in the decline 
of the family as an  agent  of  social control and the failure  of  other 
institutions to replace this function of  the family as rapidly as they have 
replaced its protective functions. Unfortunately, there are as yet insuf- 
ficient theory and data to judge how important these social welfare losses 
may be or  whether the major part of the explanation for trends and levels 
of  teenage unemployment should be sought in the functioning of  the 
labor market or in changes in the broader social, economic, and institu- 
tional context of the society. 
Even if teenage unemployment does not impose substantial short-run 
costs, it has been argued that it may have severe long-term consequences 
for an individual’s  labor market success. It is this “scar hypothesis” which 
is the subject of David T. Ellwood’s interesting and important chapter. 
Previous  researchers  have found a fairly strong correlation  between 
various measures of  an individual’s current labor force activity (e.g., 
unemployment, employment, or wage rate) and his teenage unemploy- 
ment experience. Ellwood rightly argues that the major statistical issue to 
be resolved is to determine whether such a relationship represents the 
causal effect of early unemployment on the subsequent labor market 
success of  a given individual or whether it simply reflects a correlation 
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induced by  persistent  unmeasured  differences (i.e., population heter- 
ogeneity) in labor sqpply parameters across individuals. 
The distinction between correlation and causation is always difficult to 
establish in nonexperimental data, but is especially  difficult in the current 
context because the dependent variable is the occupancy or duration of 
stay in a discrete state (e.g. ,  unemployment) and the causal variable of 
interest is a lagged dependent variable (e.g., unemployment as a teen- 
ager). The econometric methodology to deal with such problems is just 
now  being developed. It is to Ellwood’s credit that he has not only 
provided a lucid description and critique of  this literature but has also 
made an imaginative and thoughtful attempt to extend and apply this 
methodology to deal with an important issue. 
In my judgment, Ellwood’s work represents a significant advance over 
previous studies of the length of teenage unemployment, and his major 
finding that previous studies have substantially overstated these effects by 
neglecting unmeasured heterogeneity is quite plausible. Unfortunately, 
Ellwood is forced to use data which  do not  describe an individual’s 
complete employment history (i.e., data on the dates and durations of 
each spell of  employment, unemployment, and nonemployment since 
leaving school). In attempting to make his econometric model conform to 
data limitations, I believe that he may have introduced some confusion 
on two important issues-the  definition of  “true” state dependence and 
the distinction between continuous and discrete time models. I suspect 
that the model he employs is misspecified (relative to a model using ideal 
complete event history data), but it is beyond my competence to suggest 
what the best model specification might be given the available data or to 
guess what bias may inhere in the model he uses. 
The causal effect Ellwood seeks to measure is the change in current 
employment behavior induced by a previous employment event such as 
the occurrence or nonoccurrence of  teenage unemployment. Following 
the terminology in the emerging econometrics literature, he uses the term 
“state dependence” to denote such an effect. However, the two types of 
state dependence which Ellwood distinguishes  in the paper, i.e., “simple 
Markovian  dependence”  and  “true  experience  dependence”  do not 
necessarily correspond to the type of  state dependence implied by the 
scar hypothesis. 
Simple Markovian dependence is designed to control for the inertia 
which leads an individual who is currently employed to be more likely 
than an unemployed individual to be employed a short time later. This 
control is necessary because, while the dependent variable is continuous 
(e.g., number of weeks worked during the year), the observation period 
is in discrete time units of  a year. Thus it is misleading for Ellwood to 
characterize his model as continuous; in fact, I believe it suffers from 
many of the problems he raises concerning discrete time models applied 388  David T. Ellwood 
to a continuous time  process such as employment.  True experience 
dependence (i.e., the y parameter) measures the effect of, for example, 
the number of weeks worked last year on the number of weeks worked 
this year, holding constant an unmeasured person-specific labor supply 
parameter.  It is this form of  state dependence that Ellwood hopes to 
measure in order to assess the importance of the scar effect. 
I suspect that y measures a mixture of  several “pure” forms of  state 
dependence in the underlying continuous time process, not all of  which 
correspond to the causal effects implied by the scar effect. One pure form 
of state dependence which has received considerable attention recently in 
the work of  Chamberlain, Mincer,  and Heckman is  duration depen- 
dence. Roughly, duration dependence is present if  the conditional prob- 
ability of leaving a state (e.g., employment or unemployment) varies with 
the length of time spent in the state (i.e. ,  the hazard function vanes with 
duration). In the employment context, for example, Mincer suggests that 
the acquisition of firm-specific  human capital would lead to a decrease in 
the probability of  leaving a given employer as the length of job tenure 
increases. In this case, the hazard function for a given employment or  job 
spell is said to be decreasing. If  duration dependence is the only form of 
true state dependence, an individual’s  probability of exiting from a given 
spell of employment or unemployment is independent of his employment 
history prior to entering his current state. Clearly, the scar hypothesis 
suggests dependence on past history so that it is necessary to consider 
additional forms of  true state dependence beyond pure duration depen- 
dence. For  example, it  may  be reasonable  to postulate that  current 
probabilities of  leaving employment (or unemployment) at given dura- 
tion depend on the number andor duration of  previous jobs on unem- 
ployment spells as is suggested in a recent paper by Heckman and Borjas 
(1979) that was written after the Ellwood chapter. 
The scar hypothesis should probably be elaborated in order to specify 
more precisely what types of state dependence one seeks to measure. For 
example, a past history of unemployment might be expected to influence 
both the level and slope of the hazard function pertaining to a given spell 
of employment because employers may be reluctant to make job-specific 
investments in “unreliable” individuals. If  this is the case, past unemploy- 
ment reduces the degree of duration dependence but increases the likeli- 
hood of  turnover in employment at given duration. Because of  data 
limitations which preclude the identification of separate spells of employ- 
ment or unemployment, Ellwood’s model is unable to distinguish be- 
tween effects of  duration in the current spell and effects of  events that 
took place before the current spell began. His concept of true experience 
dependence probably captures a mixture of these effects. Despite these 
drawbacks, due largely to data limitations, Ellwood has written an impor- 
tant chapter, the findings of  which deserve to be taken seriously. 389  Teenage Unemployment: Permament Scars or Temporary Blemishes? 
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Comment  Burt S. Barnow 
David Ellwood’s chapter provides a significant contribution to the litera- 
ture on  the long-term effects of teenage employment problems. Although 
the previous papers on this subject cited by Ellwood do a good job of 
documenting the persistence of  employment problems,  none does as 
thorough a job of  exploring the causality of  the persistence. My com- 
ments follow the organization of  Ellwood’s chapter, covering the data, 
the descriptive results, theory, and the analytical results. 
The National Longitudinal Survey (NLS) of  young men is useful for 
Ellwood’s purpose, but it has several limitations. Because there are only 
298 observations, small effects may not be detected with statistical signifi- 
cance; this problem  is increased by  the use of  instrumental variable 
techniques. A more important limitation of the small sample size is that 
greatly different groups are constrained to have identical coefficients-it 
is questionable whether the same relationship can be expected to be 
appropriate for middle-class high school graduates and poor dropouts. 
Although Ellwood is careful to point out the limitations of the sample, 
the reader  should keep in mind the fact that the sample used is not 
representative of all youths. In addition to the omission of  youths who 
attended college and other post-secondary schools, many youths of aver- 
age intelligence and health were drafted. Thus Ellwood’s sample over- 
represents those with low intelligence or poor health. 
The presentation of  the descriptive results, especially the probability 
trees, is very helpful in tracing the labor force experience of the sample. 
For example, although only 18% of  the sample worked throughout the 
four years and only 39% were always employed in three or four of the 
years, we also find that 47% of the sample experienced no unemployment 
over the four years and 70% were unemployed in one or none of the four 
years. This suggests that unemployment and nonemployment are differ- 
ent phenomena. At several points Ellwood notes that unemployment 
appears to be a less stable variation than nonemployment. But it is worth 
noting from table 10.3 that unemployment status in year 1 is a better 
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predictor of  unemployment status in year 4  than nonemployment status 
in year 1  is of  nonemployment status in year 4. 
Ellwood’s theoretical section is excellent in its consideration of  the 
concept of state dependence. The distinctions between what he refers to 
as Markov-type dependence and experience dependence are important 
from both a theoretical perspective and a policy perspective. What is 
troubling in the theory section is the lack of economic theory for identify- 
ing the variables and the functional forms of  the models. For example, 
Ellwood uses the variable ai, to represent unobservable individual vari- 
ables. If  Sit represents I.Q., then the assumption tii,  = fii is fine, but if  ail 
represents motivation, then  such an  assumption is  inappropriate.  A 
possible extension of  the model is to include interactions of  the state 
dependence and X  or 8  variables. 
The emprical  section of  the paper  contains some very interesting 
findings. The finding that an extended period of  nonemployment has a 
small effect on future employment but a relatively large effect on wages is 
consistent with economic theory, but as Ellwood points out one cannot 
tell if the wage effects are due to human capital accumulation or signal- 
ing. However, it is important to note Ellwood’s  point that weeks worked 
is a truncated variable while the wage variable is not, and failure to 
correct for this will tend to understate the effects of  the independent 
variables. Because of the complexity of Ellwood’s models, a mechanism 
for correcting this potential bias would be extremely difficult to develop, 
but it is possible that bias in the estimates of the effects on weeks worked 
is present. 
A second problem is that Ellwood’s models require the use of  many 
instrumental variables. Some of  the instruments are lagged dependent 
variables, and if  there is serial correlation of  the error terms, the esti- 
mates of the coefficients will be inconsistent; note that in the Myer and 
Wise chapter in this volume (9), significant serial correlation for a similar 
data base was detected. 
None of these comments is intended to detract from this fine chapter. 
Ellwood has taken a topic of  great importance and applied some highly 
sophisticated techniques to isolate the parameters of interest. I am sure 
that this chapter will stimulate additional work in this area. 